M9302 Mathematical Models in Economics

Faculty of Science
Spring 2010
Extent and Intensity
4/0. 2 credit(s) (fasci plus compl plus > 4). Type of Completion: zk (examination).
Teacher(s)
Georgi Burlakov (lecturer), doc. RNDr. Martin Čadek, CSc. (deputy)
Guaranteed by
doc. RNDr. Martin Čadek, CSc.
Department of Mathematics and Statistics – Departments – Faculty of Science
Contact Person: doc. RNDr. Martin Čadek, CSc.
Timetable
Fri 10:00–11:50 M3,01023, Fri 14:00–15:50 M3,01023
Prerequisites
No specific courses are required. Basic knowledge of calculus and English is expected. Knowledge of economics is not necessary.
Course Enrolment Limitations
The course is also offered to the students of the fields other than those the course is directly associated with.
fields of study / plans the course is directly associated with
there are 7 fields of study the course is directly associated with, display
Course objectives
The course presents some of the most avantgarde mathematical tools used in the modern economic analysis. It provides introduction to Game Theory, as a branch of Applied Mathematics, by answering the question how it is used in today’s Economics. During the lectures students get familiar with basic economic terms and concepts using their own real-life intuition about the market relations between buyers and sellers. Passing the course students will develop and demonstrate ability to identify the key characteristics of a particular market situation, to relate it to one of the main standard models studied in class and to apply that model to find the correct market equilibrium solution (i.e. the optimal set(s) of possible decisions of the parties actively engaged in the market) according to the theory.
Syllabus
  • 1.1. Static Games of Complete Information 1.2. Economic Application: Cournot versus Bertrand Model of Duopoly 2.1. Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information 2.2. Economic Application: Stackelberg Model of Duopoly 3.1. Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information 3.2. Economic Application: Bank Runs, Imperfect International Competition 4.1. Repeated Games 4.2. Economic Application: Collusion between Cournot Duopolists 5.1. Information theory 5.2. Economics Application: Principal-Agent Problem 6.1. Static Games of Incomplete Information 6.2. Economic Application: First and Second-bid Auctions 7.1. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 7.2. Economic Application: Signaling and Screening, Cheap Talk
Literature
  • Laffont, J. and Martimort, D., The Theory of Incentives - The Principal Agent Model, Princeton University Press, 2002.
  • Hirshleifer, J. and Riley, J., The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge University Press 1997.
  • Gibbons R., Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press, 1992.
  • VARIAN, Hal R. Intermediate microeconomics : a modern approach. 6. ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002, xxiv, 688. ISBN 0393978303. info
Teaching methods
Lectures and homeworks.
Assessment methods
The overall course grade will be computed by converting into a grade-point score the total number of points gained from two homework assignments (20%) and a written exam (80%).
Language of instruction
English
Further comments (probably available only in Czech)
Study Materials
The course is taught annually.
Information on the per-term frequency of the course: nepravidelně.
The course is also listed under the following terms Spring 2011 - only for the accreditation, Autumn 2008, Spring 2011, Spring 2012, spring 2012 - acreditation, Spring 2013, Spring 2014, Spring 2015, Spring 2016, Spring 2017.
  • Enrolment Statistics (Spring 2010, recent)
  • Permalink: https://is.muni.cz/course/sci/spring2010/M9302