Corruption Game in Laboratory Experiment - Do the Economists
Behave Differently?

D 2014

Corruption Game in Laboratory Experiment - Do the Economists Behave Differently?

FIŠAR, Miloš a Matúš KUBÁK

Základní údaje

Originální název

Corruption Game in Laboratory Experiment - Do the Economists Behave Differently?

Autoři

FIŠAR, Miloš a Matúš KUBÁK

Vydání

Brno, Proceedings of the 18th International Conference. Current Trends in Public Sector Research, od s. 132-138, 7 s. 2014

Nakladatel

Masarykova univerzita

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Stať ve sborníku

Obor

50200 5.2 Economics and Business

Stát vydavatele

Česká republika

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Forma vydání

tištěná verze "print"

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14560/14:00074898

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

ISBN

978-80-210-6611-3

ISSN

UT WoS

000355578900016

Klíčová slova anglicky

economic experiment; corruption

Příznaky

Recenzováno

Změněno: 7. 7. 2015 10:49, doc. Ing. Miloš Fišar, Ph.D.

Anotace

V originále

Corruption has been identified as a major concern for social and economic development. An important step in understanding and addressing corruption is measuring the extent of this problem. Various approaches have been applied on investigating this phenomenon, from surveys describing current situation from sociological point of view, through more complex surveys focusing on beliefs about corruption (Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, or World Bank Governance Diagnostic Survey), to laboratory experiments (e.g. Cameron et. al. 2009). This paper discusses an economic experiment in corruption behavior, which follows modified experimental design created by Cameron. Obtained data sets show that behavior of economic agents diverges from predicted equilibrium, meaning that human beings do not achieve subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. The laboratory experiment was run at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University in Czech Republic.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/0778/2012, interní kód MU

Název: Vybrané modely veřejné ekonomie v experimentálním prostředí

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Vybrané modely veřejné ekonomie v experimentálním prostředí, DO R. 2020_Kategorie A - Specifický výzkum - Studentské výzkumné projekty

MUNI/M/0045/2013, interní kód MU

Název: Experimentální analýza rozhodování při opakované volbě: ekonomické a politologické přístupy

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Experimentální analýza rozhodování při opakované volbě: ekonomické a politologické přístupy, INTERDISCIPLINARY - Mezioborové výzkumné projekty

Citovat

FIŠAR, Miloš a Matúš KUBÁK. Corruption Game in Laboratory Experiment - Do the Economists Behave Differently? In Dagmar Špalková, Lenka Matějová. Proceedings of the 18th International Conference. Current Trends in Public Sector Research. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2014, s. 132-138. ISBN 978-80-210-6611-3.

@inproceedings{1159154,
   author = {Fišar, Miloš and Kubák, Matúš},
   address = {Brno},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 18th International Conference. Current Trends in Public Sector Research},
   editor = {Dagmar Špalková, Lenka Matějová},
   keywords = {economic experiment; corruption},
   howpublished = {tištěná verze "print"},
   language = {eng},
   location = {Brno},
   isbn = {978-80-210-6611-3},
   pages = {132-138},
   publisher = {Masarykova univerzita},
   title = {Corruption Game in Laboratory Experiment - Do the Economists Behave Differently?},
   year = {2014}
}

TY  - CONF
ID  - 1159154
AU  - Fišar, Miloš - Kubák, Matúš
PY  - 2014
TI  - Corruption Game in Laboratory Experiment - Do the Economists Behave Differently?
PB  - Masarykova univerzita
CY  - Brno
SN  - 9788021066113
KW  - economic experiment
KW  - corruption
N2  - Corruption has been identified as a major concern for social and economic development. An important step in understanding and addressing corruption is measuring the extent of this problem. Various approaches have been applied on investigating this phenomenon, from surveys describing current situation from sociological point of view, through more complex surveys focusing on beliefs about corruption (Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, or World Bank Governance Diagnostic Survey), to laboratory experiments (e.g. Cameron et. al. 2009). This paper discusses an economic experiment in corruption behavior, which follows modified experimental design created by Cameron. Obtained data sets show that behavior of economic agents diverges from predicted equilibrium, meaning that human beings do not achieve subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. The laboratory experiment was run at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University in Czech Republic.
ER  -

FIŠAR, Miloš a Matúš KUBÁK. Corruption Game in Laboratory Experiment - Do the Economists Behave Differently? In Dagmar Špalková, Lenka Matějová. \textit{Proceedings of the 18th International Conference. Current Trends in Public Sector Research}. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2014, s.~132-138. ISBN~978-80-210-6611-3.

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