Explicating the Notion of Truth Within Transparent Intensional
Logic

D 2014

Explicating the Notion of Truth Within Transparent Intensional Logic

RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří

Základní údaje

Originální název

Explicating the Notion of Truth Within Transparent Intensional Logic

Autoři

RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí)

Vydání

1. vyd. New York, Dordrecht. London, Heidelberg, Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic, od s. 167-177, 11 s. 2014

Nakladatel

Springer

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Stať ve sborníku

Obor

60300 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Stát vydavatele

Německo

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Forma vydání

tištěná verze "print"

Odkazy

URL

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14210/14:00075580

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

ISBN

978-3-319-06079-8

ISSN

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06080-4_12

UT WoS

000345581100012

Klíčová slova anglicky

truth; Transparent Intensional Logic

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 28. 4. 2015 23:32, Mgr. Vendula Hromádková

Anotace

V originále

The approach of Transparent Intensional Logic to truth differs significantly from rivalling approaches. The notion of truth is explicated by a three-level system of notions whereas the upper-level notions depend on the lower-level ones. Truth of possible world propositions lies in the bottom. Truth of hyperintensional entities – called constructions – which determine propositions is dependent on it. Truth of expressions depends on truth of their meanings; the meanings are explicated as constructions. The approach thus adopts a particular hyperintensional theory of meanings; truth of extralinguistic items is taken as primary. Truth of expressions is also dependent, either explicitly or implicitly, on language (its notion is thus also explicated within the approach). On each level, strong and weak variants of the notions are distinguished because the approach employs the Principle of Bivalence which adopts partiality. Since the formation of functions and constructions is non-circular, the system is framed within a ramified type theory having foundations in simple theory of types. The explication is immune to all forms of the Liar paradox. The definitions of notions of truth provided here are derivation rules of Pavel Tichý's system of deduction.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/0803/2013, interní kód MU

Název: Proměny a konstanty soudobé filozofie

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Proměny a konstanty soudobé filozofie, DO R. 2020_Kategorie A - Specifický výzkum - Studentské výzkumné projekty

ROZV/24/FF/KFIL2/2014, interní kód MU

Název: Stimulace VaV výkonu Filozofické fakulty - Raclavský

Investor: Ministerstvo školství, mládeže a tělovýchovy ČR, Stimulace VaV výkonu Filozofické fakulty - Raclavský

Citovat

RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří. Explicating the Notion of Truth Within Transparent Intensional Logic. In Ciuni, R.; Wansing, H.; Willkomen, C. Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic. 1. vyd. New York, Dordrecht. London, Heidelberg: Springer, 2014, s. 167-177. ISBN 978-3-319-06079-8. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06080-4_12.

@inproceedings{1183923,
   author = {Raclavský, Jiří},
   address = {New York, Dordrecht. London, Heidelberg},
   booktitle = {Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06080-4_12},
   edition = {1.},
   editor = {Ciuni, R.; Wansing, H.; Willkomen, C.},
   keywords = {truth; Transparent Intensional Logic},
   howpublished = {tištěná verze "print"},
   language = {eng},
   location = {New York, Dordrecht. London, Heidelberg},
   isbn = {978-3-319-06079-8},
   pages = {167-177},
   publisher = {Springer},
   title = {Explicating the Notion of Truth Within Transparent Intensional Logic},
   url = {http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-06080-4_12},
   year = {2014}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1183923
AU  - Raclavský, Jiří
PY  - 2014
TI  - Explicating the Notion of Truth Within Transparent Intensional Logic
PB  - Springer
CY  - New York, Dordrecht. London, Heidelberg
SN  - 9783319060798
KW  - truth
KW  - Transparent Intensional Logic
UR  - http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-06080-4_12
N2  - The approach of Transparent Intensional Logic to truth differs significantly from rivalling approaches. The notion of truth is explicated by a three-level system of notions whereas the upper-level notions depend on the lower-level ones. Truth of possible world propositions lies in the bottom. Truth of hyperintensional entities – called constructions – which determine propositions is dependent on it. Truth of expressions depends on truth of their meanings; the meanings are explicated as constructions. The approach thus adopts a particular hyperintensional theory of meanings; truth of extralinguistic items is taken as primary. Truth of expressions is also dependent, either explicitly or implicitly, on language (its notion is thus also explicated within the approach). On each level, strong and weak variants of the notions are distinguished because the approach employs the Principle of Bivalence which adopts partiality. Since the formation of functions and constructions is non-circular, the system is framed within a ramified type theory having foundations in simple theory of types. The explication is immune to all forms of the Liar paradox. The definitions of notions of truth provided here are derivation rules of Pavel Tichý's system of deduction.
ER  -

RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří. Explicating the Notion of Truth Within Transparent Intensional Logic. In Ciuni, R.; Wansing, H.; Willkomen, C. \textit{Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic}. 1. vyd. New York, Dordrecht. London, Heidelberg: Springer, 2014, s.~167-177. ISBN~978-3-319-06079-8. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06080-4\_{}12.

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