Collective Intentionality and Methodological Individualism

BINDER, Werner. Collective Intentionality and Methodological Individualism. In XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology, Yokohama. 2014.

Základní údaje

Originální název

Collective Intentionality and Methodological Individualism

Autoři

BINDER, Werner ORCID

Vydání

XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology, Yokohama, 2014

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Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Prezentace na konferencích

Obor

50000 5. Social Sciences

Stát vydavatele

Japonsko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ne

Organizační jednotka

Fakulta sociálních studií

Klíčová slova anglicky

Social theory; collective intentionality; collective action; Durkheim; Searle

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam

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Anotace

V originále

The concept of “collectivity” has been central to our discipline since its beginnings ‒ just think of Klassenbewusstsein (Marx) or conscience collectif (Durkheim). Nevertheless, the notion of collectivity has mostly been taken for granted and thus remained ambiguous and under-theorized to this day. What distinguishes a collective belief from individual beliefs shared by actors? Or is there no meaningful distinction? Even though collective forms of action and shared mental states should be of eminent interest for most sociologists, few attempted to theorize these concepts properly. In the last years, however, “collective intentionality” became a hotly debated topic among social philosophers. The philosophical use of the term “intentionality” refers not only to the intention to act, but also to the content of mental acts such as believing, desiring or feeling. Drawing on the recent philosophical debates, I would like to analyze the concept of collective intentionality and discuss its ontological and methodological consequences. Starting from the extreme positions in the discourse on collective intentionality ‒ which can be labeled “reductionism” and “holism” ‒ I will primarily discuss John Searle’s and Margaret Gilbert’s accounts on collective beliefs and actions. Searle offers a strong reading of collective intentionality that claims to be compatible with methodological (and ontological) individualism. Gilbert stresses the importance of mutual commitments for the constitution of “plural subjects” which highlights the inherent normativity of collective intentionality. The arguments of both authors can be brought together in a sociological conception of collective intentionality that has strong similarities to the Durkheimian homo duplex. Collective states and actions always entail a normative component. Collective emotions and beliefs are not only shared, but one feels an obligation to share them. Though ontologically anchored in individual bodies, “collective intentionality” turns out to be a fundamental sociological term, underpinning such concepts as cooperation, norm and communication.