2015
Political Business Cycle in the Czech Republic: Case of Municipalities
PLAČEK, Michal; Milan Jan PŮČEK; František OCHRANA; Milan KŘÁPEK; Lenka MATĚJOVÁ et al.Základní údaje
Originální název
Political Business Cycle in the Czech Republic: Case of Municipalities
Autoři
PLAČEK, Michal; Milan Jan PŮČEK; František OCHRANA; Milan KŘÁPEK a Lenka MATĚJOVÁ
Vydání
Prague Economic Papers : Quarterly Journal of Economic Theory and Policy, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2015, 1210-0455
Další údaje
Jazyk
angličtina
Typ výsledku
Článek v odborném periodiku
Obor
50600 5.6 Political science
Stát vydavatele
Česká republika
Utajení
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Odkazy
Impakt faktor
Impact factor: 0.825
Označené pro přenos do RIV
Ne
Organizační jednotka
Ekonomicko-správní fakulta
Klíčová slova anglicky
investment expenditures; political business cycle; political business cycle at the level of municipalities in the Czech Republic; transfers
Změněno: 9. 12. 2015 21:01, Mgr. Ing. Lenka Matějová, Ph.D.
Anotace
V originále
The study analyses expenditures of all municipalities of the Czech Republic over the period 2003–2013. It aims to examine whether changes in municipal spending get affected by the electoral cycle. The analysis has proven that expenditures of municipalities of the Czech Republic are influenced by the political cycle. However, the political business cycle has at the level of municipalities (compared to the macroeconomic level) its peculiarities. These arise mainly from limited options of municipal politicians to use economic instruments to win electoral votes in elections. To receive electoral votes, municipal politicians use mainly public investments and projects that are at the level of municipalities so apparent that they may influence voters in their electoral decision-making. Prior to elections, expenditures on investments significantly increase for all municipal size groups. For municipal size groups of over 50,000 residents, however, they are (per capita) higher compared to smaller municipal size groups. This may be explained by the fact that these municipalities have higher disposable resources (higher per capita own budgetary revenues, higher potential to acquire resources to co-finance municipal projects and broader portfolio of debt financing). Expenditures on transfers do not significantly change prior to municipal elections. We interpret this finding in a way that politicians prefer such investment projects that are "visible". Transfers are used to pay for certain current expenses for which municipalities may (in accordance with the established rules) apply through grants.