Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance
appraisal

J 2016

Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal

REGGIANI, Tommaso; Matteo RIZZOLLI a Lucia MARCHEGIANI

Základní údaje

Originální název

Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal

Autoři

REGGIANI, Tommaso; Matteo RIZZOLLI a Lucia MARCHEGIANI

Vydání

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2016, 0167-2681

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50200 5.2 Economics and Business

Stát vydavatele

Nizozemské království

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 1.323

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.022

Klíčová slova anglicky

Performance appraisal - Type I and Type II errors - Leniency bias - Severity bias - Economic experiment - Loss aversion

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 12. 9. 2017 20:15, Tommaso Reggiani, PhD

Anotace

V originále

A consistent empirical literature shows that in many organizations supervisors systematically overrate their employees’ performance. Such leniency bias is at odds with the standard principal-agent model and has been explained with causes that range from social interactions to fairness concerns and to collusive behavior between the supervisor and the agent. We show that the principal-agent model, extended to consider loss-aversion and reference-dependent preferences, predicts that the leniency bias is comparatively less detrimental to effort provision than the severity bias. We test this prediction with a laboratory experiment where we demonstrate that failing to reward deserving agents is significantly more detrimental than rewarding undeserving agents. This offers a novel explanation as to why supervisors tend to be lenient in their appraisals.

Citovat

REGGIANI, Tommaso; Matteo RIZZOLLI a Lucia MARCHEGIANI. Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2016, roč. 131, A, s. 183 - 197, 14 s. ISSN 0167-2681. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.022.

@article{1389222,
   author = {Reggiani, Tommaso and Rizzolli, Matteo and Marchegiani, Lucia},
   article_location = {Amsterdam},
   article_number = {A},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.022},
   keywords = {Performance appraisal - Type I and Type II errors - Leniency bias - Severity bias - Economic experiment - Loss aversion},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0167-2681},
   journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
   title = {Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal},
   url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268116301573},
   volume = {131},
   year = {2016}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1389222
AU  - Reggiani, Tommaso - Rizzolli, Matteo - Marchegiani, Lucia
PY  - 2016
TI  - Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal
JF  - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
VL  - 131
IS  - A
SP  - 183 - 197
EP  - 183 - 197
PB  - Elsevier
SN  - 01672681
KW  - Performance appraisal - Type I and Type II errors - Leniency bias - Severity bias - Economic experiment - Loss aversion
UR  - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268116301573
L2  - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268116301573
N2  - A consistent empirical literature shows that in many organizations supervisors systematically overrate their employees’ performance. Such leniency bias is at odds with the standard principal-agent model and has been explained with causes that range from social interactions to fairness concerns and to collusive behavior between the supervisor and the agent. We show that the principal-agent model, extended to consider loss-aversion and reference-dependent preferences, predicts that the leniency bias is comparatively less detrimental to effort provision than the severity bias. We test this prediction with a laboratory experiment where we demonstrate that failing to reward deserving agents is significantly more detrimental than rewarding undeserving agents. This offers a novel explanation as to why supervisors tend to be lenient in their appraisals.
ER  -

REGGIANI, Tommaso; Matteo RIZZOLLI a Lucia MARCHEGIANI. Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior \&{} Organization}. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2016, roč.~131, A, s.~183 - 197, 14 s. ISSN~0167-2681. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.022.

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