Avoidance of Risk from the Contracting Authorities: Public
Procurement Case Study.

J 2017

Avoidance of Risk from the Contracting Authorities: Public Procurement Case Study.

PLAČEK, Michal; František OCHRANA; Martin SCHMIDT; Milan KŘÁPEK; Milan Jan PŮČEK et al.

Základní údaje

Originální název

Avoidance of Risk from the Contracting Authorities: Public Procurement Case Study.

Autoři

PLAČEK, Michal; František OCHRANA; Martin SCHMIDT; Milan KŘÁPEK a Milan Jan PŮČEK

Vydání

Ekonomický časopis, Bratislava, EÚ SAV, 2017, 0013-3035

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50202 Applied Economics, Econometrics

Stát vydavatele

Slovensko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 0.327

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14560/17:00108748

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

UT WoS

000413993700001

EID Scopus

2-s2.0-85033240617

Klíčová slova anglicky

public procurement; risk; bureaucracy safety

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 8. 3. 2024 12:58, Mgr. Pavlína Kurková

Anotace

V originále

The article deals with an empiric analysis of behaviour of contracting authorities when tendering public contracts. In the context of theories dealing with rational, imperfectly rational and rationally inattentive behaviour of agents, it tries to describe the problem of avoiding risk by the contracting authorities in further detail. Theories observing behaviour of bureaucracy no matter how well they are reasoned mostly meet the problem of empiric verifiability. In this case, the authors try to fill the gap using an empiric analysis where it is worked with real data of public contracts from 2010 - 2014. We can consider the main findings to be the fact that public contracting authorities prefer strategies that are based on a reduction of risk of conflicts with the regulator. These strategies are chosen mainly based on signals of behaviour of central authorities, rather than based on the effort of gaining the most informative strategy. However, the final result is the same. In the authors' opinion, the aversion to risk by the contracting authorities, which is enforced by the public policy in this field, plays the major role.

Citovat

PLAČEK, Michal; František OCHRANA; Martin SCHMIDT; Milan KŘÁPEK a Milan Jan PŮČEK. Avoidance of Risk from the Contracting Authorities: Public Procurement Case Study. Ekonomický časopis. Bratislava: EÚ SAV, 2017, roč. 65, č. 7, s. 587-601. ISSN 0013-3035.

@article{1389420,
   author = {Plaček, Michal and Ochrana, František and Schmidt, Martin and Křápek, Milan and Půček, Milan Jan},
   article_location = {Bratislava},
   article_number = {7},
   keywords = {public procurement; risk; bureaucracy safety},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0013-3035},
   journal = {Ekonomický časopis},
   title = {Avoidance of Risk from the Contracting Authorities: Public Procurement Case Study.},
   url = {http://www.ekonom.sav.sk/sk/casopis/rocnik/7-2017},
   volume = {65},
   year = {2017}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1389420
AU  - Plaček, Michal - Ochrana, František - Schmidt, Martin - Křápek, Milan - Půček, Milan Jan
PY  - 2017
TI  - Avoidance of Risk from the Contracting Authorities: Public Procurement Case Study.
JF  - Ekonomický časopis
VL  - 65
IS  - 7
SP  - 587-601
EP  - 587-601
PB  - EÚ SAV
SN  - 00133035
KW  - public procurement
KW  - risk
KW  - bureaucracy safety
UR  - http://www.ekonom.sav.sk/sk/casopis/rocnik/7-2017
L2  - http://www.ekonom.sav.sk/sk/casopis/rocnik/7-2017
N2  - The article deals with an empiric analysis of behaviour of contracting authorities when tendering public contracts. In the context of theories dealing with rational, imperfectly rational and rationally inattentive behaviour of agents, it tries to describe the problem of avoiding risk by the contracting authorities in further detail. Theories observing behaviour of bureaucracy no matter how well they are reasoned mostly meet the problem of empiric verifiability. In this case, the authors try to fill the gap using an empiric analysis where it is worked with real data of public contracts from 2010 - 2014. We can consider the main findings to be the fact that public contracting authorities prefer strategies that are based on a reduction of risk of conflicts with the regulator. These strategies are chosen mainly based on signals of behaviour of central authorities, rather than based on the effort of gaining the most informative strategy. However, the final result is the same. In the authors' opinion, the aversion to risk by the contracting authorities, which is enforced by the public policy in this field, plays the major role.
ER  -

PLAČEK, Michal; František OCHRANA; Martin SCHMIDT; Milan KŘÁPEK a Milan Jan PŮČEK. Avoidance of Risk from the Contracting Authorities: Public Procurement Case Study. \textit{Ekonomický časopis}. Bratislava: EÚ SAV, 2017, roč.~65, č.~7, s.~587-601. ISSN~0013-3035.

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