EN

A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components

MAVROUDIS, Vasilios, Andrea CERULLI, Petr ŠVENDA, Daniel CVRČEK, Dušan KLINEC a George DANEZIS. A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components. In ACM. CCS '17: Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Dallas, TX, USA: ACM, 2017. s. 1583-1600, 18 s. ISBN 978-1-4503-4946-8. doi:10.1145/3133956.3133961.
Další formáty:   BibTeX LaTeX RIS
Základní údaje
Originální název A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components
Autoři MAVROUDIS, Vasilios (300 Řecko), Andrea CERULLI (826 Spojené království), Petr ŠVENDA (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí), Daniel CVRČEK (203 Česká republika), Dušan KLINEC (703 Slovensko, domácí) a George DANEZIS (300 Řecko).
Vydání Dallas, TX, USA, CCS '17: Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, od s. 1583-1600, 18 s. 2017.
Nakladatel ACM
Další údaje
Originální jazyk angličtina
Typ výsledku Stať ve sborníku
Obor Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics
Stát vydavatele Česká republika
Utajení není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Forma vydání elektronická verze "online"
Kód RIV RIV/00216224:14330/17:00095059
Organizační jednotka Fakulta informatiky
ISBN 978-1-4503-4946-8
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133961
Klíčová slova anglicky cryptographic hardware; hardware trojans; backdoor-tolerance; secure architecture
Štítky ECC, firank_1, secure multiparty computation, smartcard
Příznaky Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změnil Změnil: RNDr. Pavel Šmerk, Ph.D., učo 3880. Změněno: 27. 4. 2018 10:41.
Anotace
The semiconductor industry is fully globalized and integrated circuits (ICs) are commonly defined, designed and fabricated in different premises across the world. This reduces production costs, but also exposes ICs to supply chain attacks, where insiders introduce malicious circuitry into the final products. Additionally, despite extensive post-fabrication testing, it is not uncommon for ICs with subtle fabrication errors to make it into production systems. While many systems may be able to tolerate a few byzantine components, this is not the case for cryptographic hardware, storing and computing on confidential data. For this reason, many error and backdoor detection techniques have been proposed over the years. So far all attempts have been either quickly circumvented, or come with unrealistically high manufacturing costs and complexity. This paper proposes Myst, a practical high-assurance architecture, that uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, and provides strong security guarantees, even in the presence of multiple malicious or faulty components. The key idea is to combine protective-redundancy with modern threshold cryptographic techniques to build a system tolerant to hardware trojans and errors. To evaluate our design, we build a Hardware Security Module that provides the highest level of assurance possible with COTS components. Specifically, we employ more than a hundred COTS secure cryptocoprocessors, verified to FIPS140-2 Level 4 tamper-resistance standards, and use them to realize high-confidentiality random number generation, key derivation, public key decryption and signing. Our experiments show a reasonable computational overhead (less than 1% for both Decryption and Signing) and an exponential increase in backdoor-tolerance as more ICs are added.
Návaznosti
GA16-08565S, projekt VaVNázev: Rozvoj kryptoanalytických metod prostřednictvím evolučních výpočtů
Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Standardní projekty
VytisknoutZobrazeno: 22. 1. 2019 04:19

Další aplikace