The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the
Windows Code-Signing PKI

D 2018

The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the Windows Code-Signing PKI

KIM, Doowon, Bum Jun KWON, Kristián KOZÁK, Christopher GATES, Tudor DUMITRAȘ et. al.

Basic information

Original name

The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the Windows Code-Signing PKI

Authors

KIM, Doowon, Bum Jun KWON, Kristián KOZÁK (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution), Christopher GATES and Tudor DUMITRAȘ

Edition

Baltimore, MD, 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18), p. 851-868, 18 pp. 2018

Publisher

USENIX Association

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Stať ve sborníku

Field of Study

10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics

Country of publisher

United States of America

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Publication form

electronic version available online

References:

URL

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14330/18:00103415

Organization unit

Faculty of Informatics

ISBN

978-1-931971-46-1

UT WoS

000485139900050

Keywords in English

code signing; revocation

Abstract

V originále

Recent measurement studies have highlighted security threats against the code-signing public key infrastructure (PKI), such as certificates that had been compromised or issued directly to the malware authors. The primary mechanism for mitigating these threats is to revoke the abusive certificates. However, the distributed yet closed nature of the code signing PKI makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of revocations in this ecosystem. In consequence, the magnitude of signed malware threat is not fully understood. In this paper, we collect seven datasets, including the largest corpus of code-signing certificates, and we combine them to analyze the revocation process from end to end. Effective revocations rely on three roles: (1) discovering the abusive certificates, (2) revoking the certificates effectively, and (3) disseminating the revocation information for clients. We assess the challenge for discovering compromised certificates and the subsequent revocation delays. We show that erroneously setting revocation dates causes signed malware to remain valid even after the certificate has been revoked. We also report failures in disseminating the revocations, leading clients to continue trusting the revoked certificates.

Citovat

KIM, Doowon, Bum Jun KWON, Kristián KOZÁK, Christopher GATES and Tudor DUMITRAȘ. The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the Windows Code-Signing PKI. Online. In 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18). Baltimore, MD: USENIX Association, 2018, p. 851-868. ISBN 978-1-931971-46-1.

@inproceedings{1427677,
   author = {Kim, Doowon and Kwon, Bum Jun and Kozák, Kristián and Gates, Christopher and Dumitraș, Tudor},
   address = {Baltimore, MD},
   booktitle = {27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18)},
   keywords = {code signing; revocation},
   howpublished = {elektronická verze "online"},
   language = {eng},
   location = {Baltimore, MD},
   isbn = {978-1-931971-46-1},
   pages = {851-868},
   publisher = {USENIX Association},
   title = {The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the Windows Code-Signing PKI},
   url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/kim},
   year = {2018}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1427677
AU  - Kim, Doowon - Kwon, Bum Jun - Kozák, Kristián - Gates, Christopher - Dumitraș, Tudor
PY  - 2018
TI  - The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the Windows Code-Signing PKI
PB  - USENIX Association
CY  - Baltimore, MD
SN  - 9781931971461
KW  - code signing
KW  - revocation
UR  - https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/kim
N2  - Recent measurement studies have highlighted security threats against the code-signing public key infrastructure (PKI), such as certificates that had been compromised or issued directly to the malware authors. The primary mechanism for mitigating these threats is to revoke the abusive certificates. However, the distributed yet closed nature of the code signing PKI makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of revocations in this ecosystem. In consequence, the magnitude of signed malware threat is not fully understood. In this paper, we collect seven datasets, including the largest corpus of code-signing certificates, and we combine them to analyze the revocation process from end to end. Effective revocations rely on three roles: (1) discovering the abusive certificates, (2) revoking the certificates effectively, and (3) disseminating the revocation information for clients. We assess the challenge for discovering compromised certificates and the subsequent revocation delays. We show that erroneously setting revocation dates causes signed malware to remain valid even after the certificate has been revoked. We also report failures in disseminating the revocations, leading clients to continue trusting the revoked certificates.
ER  -

KIM, Doowon, Bum Jun KWON, Kristián KOZÁK, Christopher GATES and Tudor DUMITRAȘ. The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the Windows Code-Signing PKI. Online. In \textit{27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18)}. Baltimore, MD: USENIX Association, 2018, p.~851-868. ISBN~978-1-931971-46-1.

Detailed Information on Publication Record