Ownership structure of franchise chains: Trade-off between
adaptation and control

k 2018

Ownership structure of franchise chains: Trade-off between adaptation and control

JIRÁSEK, Michal; Matthias GLASER a Josef WINDSPERGER

Základní údaje

Originální název

Ownership structure of franchise chains: Trade-off between adaptation and control

Autoři

JIRÁSEK, Michal ; Matthias GLASER a Josef WINDSPERGER

Vydání

8th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks, 2018

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Prezentace na konferencích

Obor

50204 Business and management

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14560/18:00104582

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

Klíčová slova anglicky

governance form; franchising; environmental uncertainty; transaction cost theory; adaptation; control

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam

Změněno: 2. 4. 2019 12:50, doc. Ing. Michal Jirásek, Ph.D.

Anotace

V originále

This study provides a new explanation of the ownership structure of franchise firms by highlighting that there is a trade-off between adaptation and control under increasing uncertainty. Franchising networks are formed to reduce transaction costs by combining franchisee outlets (as adaptation mechanism) to increase local responsiveness and company-owned outlets (as a control mechanism) to increase central coordination. Franchisors use more local responsiveness stemming from a lower proportion of company owned outlets (PCO) to access the local profit opportunities under low to moderate environmental uncertainty and more central control by a higher PCO under a high environmental uncertainty to better coordinate interdependent local market outlets. Hence the franchisor has to find an optimal PCO by balancing the PCO decreasing effect of higher local adaptation with the PCO increasing effect of higher central coordination under increasing uncertainty. We argue that, under low to moderate degree of uncertainty, it is likely that the information and search cost savings exceed the higher coordination and control costs under lower PCO, and, under a high degree of uncertainty, it is likely that the higher coordination and control cost savings exceed the higher information and search costs under higher PCO. Therefore, there is a U-shaped relationship between PCO and environmental uncertainty. Data from Swiss and German franchise systems provide support of this hypothesis.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/0920/2017, interní kód MU

Název: Důsledky zpětné vazby na výkonnost na individuální a podnikové úrovni

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Důsledky zpětné vazby na výkonnost na individuální a podnikové úrovni, DO R. 2020_Kategorie A - Specifický výzkum - Studentské výzkumné projekty

Citovat

JIRÁSEK, Michal; Matthias GLASER a Josef WINDSPERGER. Ownership structure of franchise chains: Trade-off between adaptation and control. In 8th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks. 2018.

@proceedings{1470998,
   author = {Jirásek, Michal and Glaser, Matthias and Windsperger, Josef},
   booktitle = {8th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks},
   keywords = {governance form; franchising; environmental uncertainty; transaction cost theory; adaptation; control},
   language = {eng},
   title = {Ownership structure of franchise chains: Trade-off between adaptation and control},
   year = {2018}
}

TY  - CONF
ID  - 1470998
AU  - Jirásek, Michal - Glaser, Matthias - Windsperger, Josef
PY  - 2018
TI  - Ownership structure of franchise chains: Trade-off between adaptation and control
KW  - governance form
KW  - franchising
KW  - environmental uncertainty
KW  - transaction cost theory
KW  - adaptation
KW  - control
N2  - This study provides a new explanation of the ownership structure of franchise firms by highlighting that there is a trade-off between adaptation and control under increasing uncertainty. Franchising networks are formed to reduce transaction costs by combining franchisee outlets (as adaptation mechanism) to increase local responsiveness and company-owned outlets (as a control mechanism) to increase central coordination. Franchisors use more local responsiveness stemming from a lower proportion of company owned outlets (PCO) to access the local profit opportunities under low to moderate environmental uncertainty and more central control by a higher PCO under a high environmental uncertainty to better coordinate interdependent local market outlets. Hence the franchisor has to find an optimal PCO by balancing the PCO decreasing effect of higher local adaptation with the PCO increasing effect of higher central coordination under increasing uncertainty. We argue that, under low to moderate degree of uncertainty, it is likely that the information and search cost savings exceed the higher coordination and control costs under lower PCO, and, under a high degree of uncertainty, it is likely that the higher coordination and control cost savings exceed the higher information and search costs under higher PCO. Therefore, there is a U-shaped relationship between PCO and environmental uncertainty. Data from Swiss and German franchise systems provide support of this hypothesis.
ER  -

JIRÁSEK, Michal; Matthias GLASER a Josef WINDSPERGER. Ownership structure of franchise chains: Trade-off between adaptation and control. In \textit{8th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks}. 2018.

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