UKROP, Martin, Lydia KRAUS a Václav MATYÁŠ. Will You Trust This TLS Certificate? Perceptions of People Working in IT (Extended Version). Online. Digital Threats: Research and Practice. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2020, roč. 1, č. 4, s. 1-29. ISSN 2692-1626. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3419472. [citováno 2024-04-24]
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Základní údaje
Originální název Will You Trust This TLS Certificate? Perceptions of People Working in IT (Extended Version)
Autoři UKROP, Martin (703 Slovensko, garant, domácí), Lydia KRAUS (276 Německo, domácí) a Václav MATYÁŠ (203 Česká republika, domácí)
Vydání Digital Threats: Research and Practice, New York, NY, USA, Association for Computing Machinery, 2020, 2692-1626.
Další údaje
Originální jazyk angličtina
Typ výsledku Článek v odborném periodiku
Obor 10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics
Stát vydavatele Spojené státy
Utajení není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
WWW URL
Kód RIV RIV/00216224:14330/20:00116278
Organizační jednotka Fakulta informatiky
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3419472
Klíčová slova anglicky warning design;documentation;TLS certificate;usable security
Štítky best1
Příznaky Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změnil Změnil: RNDr. Pavel Šmerk, Ph.D., učo 3880. Změněno: 9. 6. 2022 14:57.
Anotace
Flawed TLS certificates are not uncommon on the Internet. While they signal a potential issue, in most cases they have benign causes (e.g., misconfiguration or even deliberate deployment). This adds fuzziness to the decision on whether to trust a connection or not. Little is known about perceptions of flawed certificates by IT professionals, even though their decisions impact high numbers of end users. Moreover, it is unclear how much the content of error messages and documentation influences these perceptions. To shed light on these issues, we observed 75 attendees of an industrial IT conference investigating different certificate validation errors. We also analyzed the influence of reworded error messages and redesigned documentation. We find that people working in IT have very nuanced opinions, with trust decisions being far from binary. The self-signed and the name-constrained certificates seem to be over-trusted (the latter also being poorly understood). We show that even small changes in existing error messages can positively influence resource use, comprehension, and trust assessment. At the end of the article, we summarize lessons learned from conducting usable security studies with IT professionals.
VytisknoutZobrazeno: 24. 4. 2024 00:56