Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural
preferences against helping others in the presence of moral
hazard

J 2022

Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural preferences against helping others in the presence of moral hazard

STANĚK, Rostislav, Ondřej KRČÁL a Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ

Základní údaje

Originální název

Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural preferences against helping others in the presence of moral hazard

Autoři

STANĚK, Rostislav (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí), Ondřej KRČÁL (203 Česká republika, domácí) a Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ (703 Slovensko, domácí)

Vydání

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, New York, ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2022, 2214-8043

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50200 5.2 Economics and Business

Stát vydavatele

Spojené státy

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 1.600

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14560/22:00129029

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101851

UT WoS

000793635800013

Klíčová slova anglicky

Strict liability;Assistance;Procedural preferences;Experiment;Moral hazard

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 5. 3. 2023 13:31, Mgr. Pavlína Kurková

Anotace

V originále

Governments and organizations often implement policies designed to help people affected by undesirable events. Such policies can make the society better off, but they may also create moral hazard. We use a laboratory experiment to examine two questions. First, can discretionary decisions to provide assistance overcome the problem of moral hazard and lead to higher efficiency? Second, if so, will people prefer this discretionary procedure to the strict liability policy in which no assistance is provided? We find that assistance is more efficient than a strict liability procedure. However, people still prefer the strict liability regime over assistance. We conduct additional treatments that show that this effect is not driven by the presence of human discretion, nor by aversion to risk, ambiguity, loss or inequality. This suggests that when moral hazard is a concern people have procedural preferences in favor of strict liability.

Návaznosti

GA17-00496S, projekt VaV

Název: Vliv konkurenčních kontrolních mechanismů na dodržování daňových předpisů: experimentální přístup

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Tax Compliance with a Competitive Audit Selection Mechanism: An Experimental Approach

Přiložené soubory

bootstrap.pdf

Požádat o autorskou verzi souboru

Response_Rules__2ndR_R___5_.pdf

Vyhledat podobné dokumenty

Citovat

STANĚK, Rostislav, Ondřej KRČÁL a Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ. Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural preferences against helping others in the presence of moral hazard. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. New York: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2022, roč. 98, June, s. 1-9. ISSN 2214-8043. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101851.

@article{1837417,
   author = {Staněk, Rostislav and Krčál, Ondřej and Čellárová, Katarína},
   article_location = {New York},
   article_number = {June},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101851},
   keywords = {Strict liability;Assistance;Procedural preferences;Experiment;Moral hazard},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {2214-8043},
   journal = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics},
   title = {Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural preferences against helping others in the presence of moral hazard},
   url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221480432200026X},
   volume = {98},
   year = {2022}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1837417
AU  - Staněk, Rostislav - Krčál, Ondřej - Čellárová, Katarína
PY  - 2022
TI  - Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural preferences against helping others in the presence of moral hazard
JF  - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
VL  - 98
IS  - June
SP  - 1-9
EP  - 1-9
PB  - ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
SN  - 22148043
KW  - Strict liability;Assistance;Procedural preferences;Experiment;Moral hazard
UR  - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221480432200026X
N2  - Governments and organizations often implement policies designed to help people affected by undesirable events. Such policies can make the society better off, but they may also create moral hazard. We use a laboratory experiment to examine two questions. First, can discretionary decisions to provide assistance overcome the problem of moral hazard and lead to higher efficiency? Second, if so, will people prefer this discretionary procedure to the strict liability policy in which no assistance is provided? We find that assistance is more efficient than a strict liability procedure. However, people still prefer the strict liability regime over assistance. We conduct additional treatments that show that this effect is not driven by the presence of human discretion, nor by aversion to risk, ambiguity, loss or inequality. This suggests that when moral hazard is a concern people have procedural preferences in favor of strict liability.
ER  -

STANĚK, Rostislav, Ondřej KRČÁL a Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ. Pull yourself up by your bootstraps: Identifying procedural preferences against helping others in the presence of moral hazard. \textit{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}. New York: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2022, roč.~98, June, s.~1-9. ISSN~2214-8043. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101851.

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