Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals
facilitates collective action

J 2022

Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action

LANG, Martin, Radim CHVAJA, Benjamin PURZYCKI, David VÁCLAVÍK, Rostislav STANĚK et. al.

Základní údaje

Originální název

Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action

Autoři

LANG, Martin (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí), Radim CHVAJA (203 Česká republika, domácí), Benjamin PURZYCKI (840 Spojené státy), David VÁCLAVÍK (203 Česká republika, domácí) a Rostislav STANĚK (203 Česká republika, domácí)

Vydání

ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE, London, THE ROYAL SOCIETY, 2022, 2054-5703

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

60304 Religious studies

Stát vydavatele

Velká Británie a Severní Irsko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 3.500

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14210/22:00125962

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.202202

UT WoS

000800401100004

Klíčová slova anglicky

cooperation; costly signaling; public goods game; free-riding

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 21. 3. 2023 09:48, Mgr. Pavlína Kurková

Anotace

V originále

Around the world, people engage in practices that involve self-inflicted pain and apparently wasted resources. Researchers theorized that these practices help stabilize within-group cooperation by assorting individuals committed to collective action. While this proposition was previously studied using existing religious practices, we provide a controlled framework for an experimental investigation of various predictions derived from this theory. We recruited 372 university students in the Czech Republic who were randomly assigned into either a high-cost or low-cost condition and then chose to play a public goods game (PGG) either in a group that wastes money to signal commitment to high contributions in the game or to play in the group without such signals. We predicted that cooperators would assort in the high-cost revealed group and that, despite these costs, they would contribute more to the common pool and earn larger individual rewards over five iterations of PGG compared with the concealed group and participants in the low-cost condition. The results showed that the assortment of cooperators was more effective in the high-cost condition and translated into larger contributions of the remaining endowment to the common pool, but participants in the low-cost revealed group earned the most. We conclude that costly signals can serve as an imperfect assorting mechanism, but the size of the costs needs to be carefully balanced with potential benefits to be profitable.

Návaznosti

EE2.3.20.0048, projekt VaV

Název: Laboratoř pro experimentální výzkum náboženství

EF19_074/0012727, projekt VaV

Název: MSCAfellow3@MUNI

Přiložené soubory

rsos.202202.pdf

Vyhledat podobné dokumenty

Citovat

LANG, Martin, Radim CHVAJA, Benjamin PURZYCKI, David VÁCLAVÍK a Rostislav STANĚK. Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE. London: THE ROYAL SOCIETY, 2022, roč. 9, č. 5, s. 1-19. ISSN 2054-5703. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.202202.

@article{1858958,
   author = {Lang, Martin and Chvaja, Radim and Purzycki, Benjamin and Václavík, David and Staněk, Rostislav},
   article_location = {London},
   article_number = {5},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.202202},
   keywords = {cooperation; costly signaling; public goods game; free-riding},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {2054-5703},
   journal = {ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE},
   title = {Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action},
   url = {https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.202202},
   volume = {9},
   year = {2022}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1858958
AU  - Lang, Martin - Chvaja, Radim - Purzycki, Benjamin - Václavík, David - Staněk, Rostislav
PY  - 2022
TI  - Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action
JF  - ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE
VL  - 9
IS  - 5
SP  - 1-19
EP  - 1-19
PB  - THE ROYAL SOCIETY
SN  - 20545703
KW  - cooperation
KW  - costly signaling
KW  - public goods game
KW  - free-riding
UR  - https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.202202
N2  - Around the world, people engage in practices that involve self-inflicted pain and apparently wasted resources. Researchers theorized that these practices help stabilize within-group cooperation by assorting individuals committed to collective action. While this proposition was previously studied using existing religious practices, we provide a controlled framework for an experimental investigation of various predictions derived from this theory. We recruited 372 university students in the Czech Republic who were randomly assigned into either a high-cost or low-cost condition and then chose to play a public goods game (PGG) either in a group that wastes money to signal commitment to high contributions in the game or to play in the group without such signals. We predicted that cooperators would assort in the high-cost revealed group and that, despite these costs, they would contribute more to the common pool and earn larger individual rewards over five iterations of PGG compared with the concealed group and participants in the low-cost condition. The results showed that the assortment of cooperators was more effective in the high-cost condition and translated into larger contributions of the remaining endowment to the common pool, but participants in the low-cost revealed group earned the most. We conclude that costly signals can serve as an imperfect assorting mechanism, but the size of the costs needs to be carefully balanced with potential benefits to be profitable.
ER  -

LANG, Martin, Radim CHVAJA, Benjamin PURZYCKI, David VÁCLAVÍK a Rostislav STANĚK. Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action. \textit{ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE}. London: THE ROYAL SOCIETY, 2022, roč.~9, č.~5, s.~1-19. ISSN~2054-5703. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.202202.

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