Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power
LED Light Fluctuations

D 2023

Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations

NASSI, Ben; Ofek VAYNER; Etay ILUZ; Dudi NASSI; Ján JANČÁR et. al.

Základní údaje

Originální název

Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations

Autoři

NASSI, Ben; Ofek VAYNER; Etay ILUZ; Dudi NASSI; Ján JANČÁR ; Daniel GENKIN; Eran TROMER; Boris ZADOV a Yuval ELOVICI

Vydání

New York, NY, USA, 30th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'2023), od s. 268-280, 13 s. 2023

Nakladatel

Association for Computing Machinery

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Stať ve sborníku

Obor

10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics

Stát vydavatele

Spojené státy

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Forma vydání

elektronická verze "online"

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14330/23:00131846

Organizační jednotka

Fakulta informatiky

ISBN

979-8-4007-0050-7

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3616620

UT WoS

001124987200019

EID Scopus

2-s2.0-85179852242

Klíčová slova anglicky

Cryptanalysis; Side-Channel Attack; ECDSA; RSA; SIKE

Štítky

core_A, firank_1

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 7. 4. 2024 23:27, RNDr. Pavel Šmerk, Ph.D.

Anotace

V originále

Although power LEDs have been integrated in various devices that perform cryptographic operations for decades, the cryptanalysis risk they pose has not yet been investigated. In this paper, we present optical cryptanalysis, a new form of cryptanalytic side- channel attack, in which secret keys are extracted by using a pho- todiode to measure the light emitted by a device’s power LED and analyzing subtle fluctuations in the light intensity during crypto- graphic operations. We analyze the optical leakage of power LEDs of various consumer devices and the factors that affect the optical SNR. We then demonstrate end-to-end optical cryptanalytic attacks against a range of consumer devices (smartphone, smartcard, and Raspberry Pi, along with their USB peripherals) and recover secret keys (RSA, ECDSA, SIKE) from prior and recent versions of popular cryptographic libraries (GnuPG, Libgcrypt, PQCrypto-SIDH) from a maximum distance of 25 meters.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/1389/2022, interní kód MU

Název: Aplikovaný výzkum na FI: Bezpečnost počítačových systémů, softwarových architektur kritických infrastruktur s forenzními aspekty, zpracování dat pokročilých sensorů a algoritmy plánování v dopravě a logistice

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Aplikovaný výzkum na FI: Bezpečnost počítačových systémů, softwarových architektur kritických infrastruktur s forenzními aspekty, zpracování dat pokročilých sensorů a algoritmy plánování v dopravě a logistice

MUNI/A/1433/2022, interní kód MU

Název: Zapojení studentů Fakulty informatiky do mezinárodní vědecké komunity 23

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Zapojení studentů Fakulty informatiky do mezinárodní vědecké komunity 23

Citovat

NASSI, Ben; Ofek VAYNER; Etay ILUZ; Dudi NASSI; Ján JANČÁR; Daniel GENKIN; Eran TROMER; Boris ZADOV a Yuval ELOVICI. Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations. Online. In 30th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'2023). New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2023, s. 268-280. ISBN 979-8-4007-0050-7. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3616620.

@inproceedings{2321197,
   author = {Nassi, Ben and Vayner, Ofek and Iluz, Etay and Nassi, Dudi and Jančár, Ján and Genkin, Daniel and Tromer, Eran and Zadov, Boris and Elovici, Yuval},
   address = {New York, NY, USA},
   booktitle = {30th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'2023)},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3616620},
   keywords = {Cryptanalysis; Side-Channel Attack; ECDSA; RSA; SIKE},
   howpublished = {elektronická verze "online"},
   language = {eng},
   location = {New York, NY, USA},
   isbn = {979-8-4007-0050-7},
   pages = {268-280},
   publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
   title = {Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations},
   year = {2023}
}

TY  - CONF
ID  - 2321197
AU  - Nassi, Ben - Vayner, Ofek - Iluz, Etay - Nassi, Dudi - Jančár, Ján - Genkin, Daniel - Tromer, Eran - Zadov, Boris - Elovici, Yuval
PY  - 2023
TI  - Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations
PB  - Association for Computing Machinery
CY  - New York, NY, USA
SN  - 9798400700507
KW  - Cryptanalysis
KW  - Side-Channel Attack
KW  - ECDSA
KW  - RSA
KW  - SIKE
N2  - Although power LEDs have been integrated in various devices that perform cryptographic operations for decades, the cryptanalysis risk they pose has not yet been investigated. In this paper, we present optical cryptanalysis, a new form of cryptanalytic side- channel attack, in which secret keys are extracted by using a pho- todiode to measure the light emitted by a device’s power LED and analyzing subtle fluctuations in the light intensity during crypto- graphic operations. We analyze the optical leakage of power LEDs of various consumer devices and the factors that affect the optical SNR. We then demonstrate end-to-end optical cryptanalytic attacks against a range of consumer devices (smartphone, smartcard, and Raspberry Pi, along with their USB peripherals) and recover secret keys (RSA, ECDSA, SIKE) from prior and recent versions of popular cryptographic libraries (GnuPG, Libgcrypt, PQCrypto-SIDH) from a maximum distance of 25 meters.
ER  -

NASSI, Ben; Ofek VAYNER; Etay ILUZ; Dudi NASSI; Ján JANČÁR; Daniel GENKIN; Eran TROMER; Boris ZADOV a Yuval ELOVICI. Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations. Online. In \textit{30th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'2023)}. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2023, s.~268-280. ISBN~979-8-4007-0050-7. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3616620.

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