Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the
Standard Meter

C 2024

Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter

MÁCHA, Jakub

Základní údaje

Originální název

Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter

Autoři

MÁCHA, Jakub

Vydání

New York, Engaging Kripke with Wittgenstein : The Standard Meter, Contingent Apriori, and Beyond, od s. 127-140, 14 s. Routledge studies in twentieth-century philosophy, 2024

Nakladatel

Routledge

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Kapitola resp. kapitoly v odborné knize

Obor

60301 Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Stát vydavatele

Spojené státy

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Forma vydání

tištěná verze "print"

Odkazy

URL

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14210/24:00135266

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

ISBN

978-1-032-13997-5

Klíčová slova anglicky

Kripke; Wittgenstein

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 4. 4. 2025 11:08, Mgr. et Mgr. Stanislav Hasil, Ph.D.

Anotace

V originále

I argue that Kripke’s apparent disagreement with Wittgenstein’s claims about the Standard Meter is based on two different ways of fixing reference. Kripke proposes that “meter” rigidly refers to the length that the Standard Meter has at time t0. This length is an abstract object postulated by the theory of absolute space. Wittgenstein, in contrast, seems to presuppose that “meter” rigidly refers to the Standard Meter. Both ways of fixing reference have their advantages and disadvantages. Yet Wittgenstein’s way of fixing reference entails that a statement attributing to the Standard Meter a definite length in meters is without truth-value, while for Kripke, such attributions are accidentally true or accidentally false. This truth-value gap reappears in Kripke’s modal theoretical framework. Existential and modal claims about basic particulars are without truth-value. Both Wittgenstein and Kripke cannot but allow for certain truth-value gaps, which are instances of paracomplete reasoning.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/1082/2022, interní kód MU

Název: Aspekty soudobé filozofie V

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Aspekty soudobé filozofie V

Citovat

MÁCHA, Jakub. Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter. In Gustafsson, Martin; Kuusela, Oskari; Mácha, Jakub. Engaging Kripke with Wittgenstein : The Standard Meter, Contingent Apriori, and Beyond. New York: Routledge, 2024, s. 127-140. Routledge studies in twentieth-century philosophy. ISBN 978-1-032-13997-5. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003240792-7.

@inbook{2343545,
   author = {Mácha, Jakub},
   address = {New York},
   booktitle = {Engaging Kripke with Wittgenstein : The Standard Meter, Contingent Apriori, and Beyond},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003240792-7},
   editor = {Gustafsson, Martin; Kuusela, Oskari; Mácha, Jakub},
   keywords = {Kripke; Wittgenstein},
   howpublished = {tištěná verze "print"},
   language = {eng},
   location = {New York},
   isbn = {978-1-032-13997-5},
   pages = {127-140},
   publisher = {Routledge},
   title = {Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter},
   url = {https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003240792-7/afraid-truth-gaps-wittgenstein-kripke-standard-meter-jakub-m%C3%A1cha?context=ubx&refId=3f7df89b-dd86-419d-832e-df6d16958f8d},
   year = {2024}
}

TY  - CHAP
ID  - 2343545
AU  - Mácha, Jakub
PY  - 2024
TI  - Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter
VL  - Routledge studies in twentieth-century philosophy
PB  - Routledge
CY  - New York
SN  - 9781032139975
KW  - Kripke
KW  - Wittgenstein
UR  - https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003240792-7/afraid-truth-gaps-wittgenstein-kripke-standard-meter-jakub-m%C3%A1cha?context=ubx&refId=3f7df89b-dd86-419d-832e-df6d16958f8d
N2  - I argue that Kripke’s apparent disagreement with Wittgenstein’s claims about the Standard Meter is based on two different ways of fixing reference. Kripke proposes that “meter” rigidly refers to the length that the Standard Meter has at time t0. This length is an abstract object postulated by the theory of absolute space. Wittgenstein, in contrast, seems to presuppose that “meter” rigidly refers to the Standard Meter. Both ways of fixing reference have their advantages and disadvantages. Yet Wittgenstein’s way of fixing reference entails that a statement attributing to the Standard Meter a definite length in meters is without truth-value, while for Kripke, such attributions are accidentally true or accidentally false. This truth-value gap reappears in Kripke’s modal theoretical framework. Existential and modal claims about basic particulars are without truth-value. Both Wittgenstein and Kripke cannot but allow for certain truth-value gaps, which are instances of paracomplete reasoning.
ER  -

MÁCHA, Jakub. Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter. In Gustafsson, Martin; Kuusela, Oskari; Mácha, Jakub. \textit{Engaging Kripke with Wittgenstein : The Standard Meter, Contingent Apriori, and Beyond}. New York: Routledge, 2024, s.~127-140. Routledge studies in twentieth-century philosophy. ISBN~978-1-032-13997-5. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003240792-7.

Přehled o publikaci