HANELT, Etienne. A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary. In Nuffield Early Career Workshop in Socio-Legal Studies, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. 2023.
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Základní údaje
Originální název A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary
Autoři HANELT, Etienne (276 Německo, garant, domácí).
Vydání Nuffield Early Career Workshop in Socio-Legal Studies, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 2023.
Další údaje
Originální jazyk angličtina
Typ výsledku Prezentace na konferencích
Obor 50501 Law
Stát vydavatele Velká Británie a Severní Irsko
Utajení není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
WWW Web nakladatele
Kód RIV RIV/00216224:14220/23:00133122
Organizační jednotka Právnická fakulta
Klíčová slova anglicky courts; hybrid regime; rule of law; Hungary; informal institutions
Štítky rivok
Příznaky Mezinárodní význam
Změnil Změnila: Mgr. Petra Georgala, učo 32967. Změněno: 2. 4. 2024 17:43.
Anotace
Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges, making a focus on legal characteristics insufficient to detect their actual functioning. Through an in-depth case study of Hungary’s judiciary after 2010, we show that ‘constitutional tinkering’ and informal clientelistic networks, used to control the executive and legislative branches, were also applied to the judiciary. Still, they remain underdeveloped because of the domestic and external restraints of judicial independence. Since reliable hard data is not available, we build our paper on interviews with Hungarian judges conducted in 2022. Based on these, we test the validity of existing theories and leverage thick descriptions to explain the means of control over judges.
Návaznosti
101002660, interní kód MUNázev: Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay (Akronym: INFINITY)
Investor: Evropská unie, Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay, ERC (Excellent Science)
VytisknoutZobrazeno: 7. 7. 2024 11:48