Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re
Reading

J 2023

Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading

DOMINIK, Martin

Základní údaje

Originální název

Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading

Autoři

DOMINIK, Martin

Vydání

Disputatio, 2023, 0873-626X

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

60301 Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Stát vydavatele

Portugalsko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 0.400

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14210/23:00136399

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

DOI

https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002

UT WoS

001263242800003

Klíčová slova anglicky

Brandom; game of giving and asking for reasons; inferentialism; interpretation; scorekeeping

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 23. 1. 2025 09:07, Mgr. Kateřina Urubková

Anotace

V originále

In this paper, I examine Brandom’s notion of a de re reading of a tradition and question its legitimacy under certain circumstances. Specifically, I argue that within the language game of giving and asking for reasons, commitments should be ascribed to the utterer within reasonable limits, with the utterer only responsible for intentional or negligent breaches of duty. Even if we were to include an ideal speaker who knows all facts available at the time of her utterance, she cannot be held accountable for ignorance of things that do not yet exist. Therefore, I further argue that the time of the utterance must be taken into consideration when ascribing commitments and keeping score in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This temporal aspect is suppressed by Brandom’s notion of de re reading for pragmatic reasons, as he seeks to tell an inferentialist story of the philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, I argue that legitimacy poses a problem even for this approach because Brandom formulates his account in terms of rules, responsibility and sanctions. I offer a critical perspective on Brandom’s de re reading and the broader implications of his inferentialist framework.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/1412/2023, interní kód MU

Název: Filozofie pro odolnou společnost

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Filozofie pro odolnou společnost

Citovat

DOMINIK, Martin. Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading. Disputatio. 2023, roč. 15, č. 68, s. 39 - 54. ISSN 0873-626X. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002.

@article{2417041,
   author = {Dominik, Martin},
   article_number = {68},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002},
   keywords = {Brandom; game of giving and asking for reasons; inferentialism; interpretation; scorekeeping},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0873-626X},
   journal = {Disputatio},
   title = {Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading},
   url = {https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002},
   volume = {15},
   year = {2023}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2417041
AU  - Dominik, Martin
PY  - 2023
TI  - Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading
JF  - Disputatio
VL  - 15
IS  - 68
SP  - 39 - 54
EP  - 39 - 54
SN  - 0873626X
KW  - Brandom
KW  - game of giving and asking for reasons
KW  - inferentialism
KW  - interpretation
KW  - scorekeeping
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002
N2  - In this paper, I examine Brandom’s notion of a de re reading of a tradition and question its legitimacy under certain circumstances. Specifically, I argue that within the language game of giving and asking for reasons, commitments should be ascribed to the utterer within reasonable limits, with the utterer only responsible for intentional or negligent breaches of duty. Even if we were to include an ideal speaker who knows all facts available at the time of her utterance, she cannot be held accountable for ignorance of things that do not yet exist. Therefore, I further argue that the time of the utterance must be taken into consideration when ascribing commitments and keeping score in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This temporal aspect is suppressed by Brandom’s notion of de re reading for pragmatic reasons, as he seeks to tell an inferentialist story of the philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, I argue that legitimacy poses a problem even for this approach because Brandom formulates his account in terms of rules, responsibility and sanctions. I offer a critical perspective on Brandom’s de re reading and the broader implications of his inferentialist framework.
ER  -

DOMINIK, Martin. Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading. \textit{Disputatio}. 2023, roč.~15, č.~68, s.~39 - 54. ISSN~0873-626X. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002.

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