Judicial Independence

C 2025

Judicial Independence

KOSAŘ, David a Samuel SPÁČ

Základní údaje

Originální název

Judicial Independence

Název česky

Nezávislost soudů

Autoři

KOSAŘ, David a Samuel SPÁČ

Vydání

1. vyd. Cambridge, The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory, od s. 867-883, 17 s. Cambridge Law Handbooks, 2025

Nakladatel

Cambridge University Press

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Kapitola resp. kapitoly v odborné knize

Obor

50501 Law

Stát vydavatele

Velká Británie a Severní Irsko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Forma vydání

tištěná verze "print"

Odkazy

Web nakladatele

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14220/25:00140364

Organizační jednotka

Právnická fakulta

ISBN

978-1-108-49131-0

Klíčová slova česky

soudy; soudci; nezávislost soudů; nestrannost; právní stát; dělba moci; soudní správa; soudní rozhodování; korupce v soudnictví

Klíčová slova anglicky

courts; judges; judicial independence; impartiality; rule of law; separation of powers; judicial governance; judicial decision-making; judicial corruption

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 12. 3. 2026 11:39, Mgr. Petra Georgala

Anotace

V originále

Despite being nearly universally recognised as a virtue, judicial independence has been challenged in almost all parts of the world. Some commentators even consider it to be so open to differing interpretations as to be a useless concept, that should be unpacked to its smaller components to be studied meaningfully. We are less cynical about the idea. According to our theory, judicial independence exists where powerful actors are unable or unwilling to inappropriately interfere with the workings of the judiciary. Judicial independence is thus a relational concept and always results from the interplay between the capacity and willingness of powerful actors to inappropriately interfere with the judiciary, and the capacity and willingness of judicial actors and their allies to withstand such actions. We distinguish three levels of judicial independence: de jure institutional independence, de facto institutional independence, and decisional independence. Courts are thus independent when powerful actors do not consistently impose their preferences in disputes they have a stake, either by capturing the courts through formal changes of laws governing the judiciary, through rigging these laws in their favour, or by skewing judicial decision-making. By contrast, a dependent judiciary is the one that is captured, rigged or skewed.

Citovat

KOSAŘ, David a Samuel SPÁČ. Judicial Independence. In Richard Bellamy and Jeff King. The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory. 1. vyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025, s. 867-883. Cambridge Law Handbooks. ISBN 978-1-108-49131-0. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.

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   author = {Kosař, David and Spáč, Samuel},
   address = {Cambridge},
   booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143},
   edition = {1},
   editor = {Richard Bellamy and Jeff King},
   keywords = {courts; judges; judicial independence; impartiality; rule of law; separation of powers; judicial governance; judicial decision-making; judicial corruption},
   howpublished = {tištěná verze "print"},
   language = {eng},
   location = {Cambridge},
   isbn = {978-1-108-49131-0},
   pages = {867-883},
   publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   title = {Judicial Independence},
   url = {https://www.cambridge.org/cz/universitypress/subjects/law/constitutional-and-administrative-law/cambridge-handbook-constitutional-theory?format=HB&isbn=9781108491310},
   year = {2025}
}

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AU  - Kosař, David - Spáč, Samuel
PY  - 2025
TI  - Judicial Independence
VL  - Cambridge Law Handbooks
PB  - Cambridge University Press
CY  - Cambridge
SN  - 9781108491310
KW  - courts
KW  - judges
KW  - judicial independence
KW  - impartiality
KW  - rule of law
KW  - separation of powers
KW  - judicial governance
KW  - judicial decision-making
KW  - judicial corruption
UR  - https://www.cambridge.org/cz/universitypress/subjects/law/constitutional-and-administrative-law/cambridge-handbook-constitutional-theory?format=HB&isbn=9781108491310
N2  - Despite being nearly universally recognised as a virtue, judicial independence has been challenged in almost all parts of the world. Some commentators even consider it to be so open to differing interpretations as to be a useless concept, that should be unpacked to its smaller components to be studied meaningfully. We are less cynical about the idea. According to our theory, judicial independence exists where powerful actors are unable or unwilling to inappropriately interfere with the workings of the judiciary. Judicial independence is thus a relational concept and always results from the interplay between the capacity and willingness of powerful actors to inappropriately interfere with the judiciary, and the capacity and willingness of judicial actors and their allies to withstand such actions. We distinguish three levels of judicial independence: de jure institutional independence, de facto institutional independence, and decisional independence. Courts are thus independent when powerful actors do not consistently impose their preferences in disputes they have a stake, either by capturing the courts through formal changes of laws governing the judiciary, through rigging these laws in their favour, or by skewing judicial decision-making. By contrast, a dependent judiciary is the one that is captured, rigged or skewed.
ER  -

KOSAŘ, David a Samuel SPÁČ. Judicial Independence. In Richard Bellamy and Jeff King. \textit{The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory}. 1. vyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025, s.~867-883. Cambridge Law Handbooks. ISBN~978-1-108-49131-0. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.

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