Interpretive injustice : The moral dimension of understanding

J 2025

Interpretive injustice : The moral dimension of understanding

DOMINIK, Martin

Základní údaje

Originální název

Interpretive injustice : The moral dimension of understanding

Autoři

DOMINIK, Martin

Vydání

HERMENEIA, Iasi, Romania, UNIV ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA IASI, FAC FILOSOFIE STIINTE SOCIAL-POLITICE, 2025, 1453-9047

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

60301 Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Stát vydavatele

Rumunsko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 0.100 v roce 2024

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14210/25:00141285

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

UT WoS

001515652700001

Klíčová slova anglicky

Hermeneutics; Epistemic injustice; Interpretive injustice; Virtuous hermeneutics; Hermeneutical injustice

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 26. 3. 2026 13:23, Bc. Nikol Neupauerová Gistingrová

Anotace

V originále

This article explores the moral dimension of understanding, focusing on the concept of interpretive injustice. Drawing on work on epistemic injustice, it examines how language and interpretive practices reflect and perpetuate dominance and oppression. Two forms of interpretive injustice are defined: ignorance and misinterpretation. Ignorance arises from a lack of engagement with minority hermeneutical resources, while misinterpretation involves the misattribution of meanings by dominant groups. The article argues that interpretive injustice causes both epistemic and moral harm. It also challenges the emphasis on macro-level power dynamics, suggesting that interpretive injustice can also be done to members of dominant groups. Interpretive injustice need not be systematic to constitute a moral wrong. The refined definition of the notion recognises that interpretive injustice occurs when an utterance is interpreted using the hermeneutical resources of a different sociolinguistic group despite relevant differences between these resources.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/1548/2024, interní kód MU

Název: Filosofie pro odolnou společnost II

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Filosofie pro odolnou společnost II

Citovat

DOMINIK, Martin. Interpretive injustice : The moral dimension of understanding. HERMENEIA. Iasi, Romania: UNIV ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA IASI, FAC FILOSOFIE STIINTE SOCIAL-POLITICE, 2025, roč. 34, č. 1, s. 5-19. ISSN 1453-9047.

@article{2500258,
   author = {Dominik, Martin},
   article_location = {Iasi, Romania},
   article_number = {1},
   keywords = {Hermeneutics; Epistemic injustice; Interpretive injustice; Virtuous hermeneutics; Hermeneutical injustice},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1453-9047},
   journal = {HERMENEIA},
   title = {Interpretive injustice : The moral dimension of understanding},
   url = {https://hermeneia.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/01_Dominik_2025.pdf},
   volume = {34},
   year = {2025}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2500258
AU  - Dominik, Martin
PY  - 2025
TI  - Interpretive injustice : The moral dimension of understanding
JF  - HERMENEIA
VL  - 34
IS  - 1
SP  - 5-19
EP  - 5-19
PB  - UNIV ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA IASI, FAC FILOSOFIE STIINTE SOCIAL-POLITICE
SN  - 14539047
KW  - Hermeneutics
KW  - Epistemic injustice
KW  - Interpretive injustice
KW  - Virtuous hermeneutics
KW  - Hermeneutical injustice
UR  - https://hermeneia.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/01_Dominik_2025.pdf
N2  - This article explores the moral dimension of understanding, focusing on the concept of interpretive injustice. Drawing on work on epistemic injustice, it examines how language and interpretive practices reflect and perpetuate dominance and oppression. Two forms of interpretive injustice are defined: ignorance and misinterpretation. Ignorance arises from a lack of engagement with minority hermeneutical resources, while misinterpretation involves the misattribution of meanings by dominant groups. The article argues that interpretive injustice causes both epistemic and moral harm. It also challenges the emphasis on macro-level power dynamics, suggesting that interpretive injustice can also be done to members of dominant groups. Interpretive injustice need not be systematic to constitute a moral wrong. The refined definition of the notion recognises that interpretive injustice occurs when an utterance is interpreted using the hermeneutical resources of a different sociolinguistic group despite relevant differences between these resources.
ER  -

DOMINIK, Martin. Interpretive injustice : The moral dimension of understanding. \textit{HERMENEIA}. Iasi, Romania: UNIV ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA IASI, FAC FILOSOFIE STIINTE SOCIAL-POLITICE, 2025, roč.~34, č.~1, s.~5-19. ISSN~1453-9047.

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