Paradoxes of Denotation and Reference

RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří. Paradoxes of Denotation and Reference. In Seventh European Congress of Analytical Philosophy (ECAP7). 2011.

Základní údaje

• Originální název: Paradoxes of Denotation and Reference
• Název česky: Paradoxy denotace a reference
• Autoři: RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí).
• Vydání: Seventh European Congress of Analytical Philosophy (ECAP7), 2011.

Další údaje

• Originální jazyk: angličtina
• Typ výsledku: Konferenční abstrakt
• Obor: 60300 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
• Stát vydavatele: Itálie
• Utajení: není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
• Kód RIV: RIV/00216224:14210/11:00053035
• Organizační jednotka: Filozofická fakulta
• Klíčová slova anglicky: semantic paradoxes; denotation; reference
• Štítky: rivok
• Příznaky: Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Anotace

Paradoxes of denotation and reference receive an increasing attention. Since the paradox-producing expressions involve semantic terms and all semantic concepts are language-relative, their critical theory is needed. Then, a solution to the paradoxes is at hand. One refutes the hidden premise that the paradox-producing term expresses a concept-meaning yielding the problematic denotatum/referent. Utilizing Tichý's logical framework for explication, the meanings of expressions are explicated as (abstract, structured) constructions which construct denotata (intensions/extensions); the referent of an expression (with respect to a possible world and time) is the value of the intension (or it is identical with its denotatum). Tichý's type theory classifies functions, constructions and functions from or to constructions. Though the framework is basically classical, it treats also partial functions. I model coding means of language by a family of codes, a k order code being a function from expressions to k order constructions. Explications of the basic semantic notions are then offered. Showing the solutions to representative paradoxes, I discuss also a possible revenge. Again, I demonstrate that every language is restricted in its expressive power, it cannot discuss its own semantic properties (it cannot code the respective concepts despite their definability). I compare this result with Tarski's undefinability theorem.