Question: 

How did the 1978, 1982, and 2006 wars create Israeli, Lebanese, and Hezbollah "red lines" along the northern frontier, and why did those war-forged positions prevent a recognised peace border or treaty from emerging (despite UN demarcation and U.S. mediation)?

Abstract:

This research paper examines how the wars of 1978, 1982, and 2006 created "red lines" including security arrangements, overflights, and sovereignty issues for Lebanon, Israel, and Hizballah, and how these dynamics consequently created an internationally managed ceasefire zone without a durable and comprehensive peace agreement. Using qualitative process tracing and document analysis, this thesis examines Israeli security doctrine calculations, Syrian and Iranian proxy interests, and Lebanese intra-political dynamics, alongside United Nations resolutions and the evolution of the peace process. This analysis uncovers how instead of a peace, a tenuous armistice is in its place.
 

The study draws on primary sources, archival material, and scholarly analysis. Is is guided by a neoclassical realist perspective and the theory of state weakness to understand the behaviour of the actors. This framework illuminates how domestic constraints combined with external meddling created maximalist bargaining positions. The thesis concludes that the outcome is not accidental but structurally driven by overlapping regional interests, resulting in an armistice regime overseen by international actors.