# ESF:BPE_ZATH Introduction to Game Theory - Course Information

## BPE_ZATH Introduction to Game Theory

**Faculty of Economics and Administration**

Spring 2011

**Extent and Intensity**- 2/2. 8 credit(s). Type of Completion: zk (examination).
**Teacher(s)**- doc. Ing. Rostislav Staněk, Ph.D. (lecturer)

doc. Ing. Rostislav Staněk, Ph.D. (seminar tutor) **Guaranteed by**- Ing. Michal Kvasnička, Ph.D.

Department of Economics – Faculty of Economics and Administration

Contact Person: Lydie Pravdová **Timetable**- Tue 9:20–11:00 P104
- Timetable of Seminar Groups:

*R. Staněk*

BPE_ZATH/02: Tue 12:50–14:30 S309,*R. Staněk* **Prerequisites**(in Czech)-
**BPM_STA1**Statistics 1 &&**BPE_MIE1**Microeconomics 1 ||**BPE_MIC1**Microeconomics 1 **Course Enrolment Limitations**- The course is also offered to the students of the fields other than those the course is directly associated with.
**fields of study / plans the course is directly associated with**- Economics (programme ESF, M-EKT)
- National Economy (programme ESF, B-HPS)

**Course objectives**- Students will learn basic principles of game theory in the course. They will get acquainted with the concept of Nash equilibrium and they will learn to find the equilibrium in strategic games, extensive games, games with incomplete information and repeated games. Students will understand how is game theory applied when analyzing oligopolistic markets, auctions, elections, providing of public goods, etc. At the end of the course students should be familiar with basic methods of game theory and should be able to employ them when explaining economic phenomenons. Students should be able to create simple model of a given situation and find its equilibrium.
**Syllabus**- 1. Strategic games a Nash equilibrium
- 2. Strategic games: economic ilustrations
- 3. Mixed strategies
- 4. Mixed strategies: economic ilustrations
- 5. Extensive games
- 6. Extensive games: subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction
- 7. Extensive games: uncertainty and simulataneous moves
- 8. Games with imperfect information: bayesian games
- 9. Games with imperfect information: economic ilustrations of bayesian games
- 10. Games with imperfect information:extensive games
- 11. Games with imperfect information: signaling
- 12. Repeated games
- 13. Repeated games: economic ilustrations

**Literature**- OSBORNE, Martin J.
*An introduction to game theory*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2004, xvii, 533. ISBN 9780195128956. info

*required literature*- VEGA-REDONDO, Fernando.
*Economics and the theory of games*. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, xii, 512. ISBN 0521775906. info

*recommended literature*- OSBORNE, Martin J.
**Teaching methods**- The course has a form of a lecture and a seminar. Lectures are based on economic illustrations of game theory. Students are supposed to solve extensions of these illustrations on seminars.
**Assessment methods**- The course is completed by wrtitten exam. Total grade will be composed from homeworks(20%), mid-term exam (20%) and final exam (60%). A necessary condition for the completion of the course is to reach at least 60% score from the final exam and 60% score from the sum of homeworks, mid-term and final exam.
**Language of instruction**- Czech
**Further comments (probably available only in Czech)**- Study Materials

The course is taught annually.

General note: Povinné pro studenty kteří zahájili studium v ak. r. 2008/2009 a později.

Credit evaluation note: k = 1,5.

- Enrolment Statistics (Spring 2011, recent)
- Permalink: https://is.muni.cz/course/econ/spring2011/BPE_ZATH