The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit
Substitution

J 2022

The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution

RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří

Základní údaje

Originální název

The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution

Autoři

RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí)

Vydání

Logic and logical philosophy, Nicolas Copernicus University Press, 2022, 1425-3305

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

60301 Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Stát vydavatele

Polsko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 0.500

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14210/22:00129024

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.011

UT WoS

000701852400001

Klíčová slova anglicky

existential generalisation; quantifying in; explicit substitution; hyperintensional logic; natural deduction

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 3. 4. 2023 10:52, Mgr. et Mgr. Lucie Racyn

Anotace

V originále

The present paper offers the rule of existential generalisation (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution.

Návaznosti

GA19-12420S, projekt VaV

Název: Hyperintenzionální význam, teorie typů a logická dedukce (Akronym: Hyperintensionality and Types)

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Hyperintensional meaning, type theory and logical deduction

Citovat

RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří. The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution. Logic and logical philosophy. Nicolas Copernicus University Press, 2022, roč. 31, č. 1, s. 105-141. ISSN 1425-3305. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.011.

@article{1829739,
   author = {Raclavský, Jiří},
   article_number = {1},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.011},
   keywords = {existential generalisation; quantifying in; explicit substitution; hyperintensional logic; natural deduction},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1425-3305},
   journal = {Logic and logical philosophy},
   title = {The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution},
   url = {https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/31855/30016},
   volume = {31},
   year = {2022}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1829739
AU  - Raclavský, Jiří
PY  - 2022
TI  - The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution
JF  - Logic and logical philosophy
VL  - 31
IS  - 1
SP  - 105-141
EP  - 105-141
PB  - Nicolas Copernicus University Press
SN  - 14253305
KW  - existential generalisation
KW  - quantifying in
KW  - explicit substitution
KW  - hyperintensional logic
KW  - natural deduction
UR  - https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/31855/30016
N2  - The present paper offers the rule of existential generalisation (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution.
ER  -

RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří. The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution. \textit{Logic and logical philosophy}. Nicolas Copernicus University Press, 2022, roč.~31, č.~1, s.~105-141. ISSN~1425-3305. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2021.011.

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