The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies
in the emergence of cooperative group norms

J 2022

The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms

SALAZAR ADAMS, Miguel, Daniel Joel SHAW, Kristína CZEKÓOVÁ, Rostislav STANĚK, Milan BRÁZDIL et. al.

Základní údaje

Originální název

The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms

Autoři

SALAZAR ADAMS, Miguel (484 Mexiko, domácí), Daniel Joel SHAW (826 Velká Británie a Severní Irsko, domácí), Kristína CZEKÓOVÁ (703 Slovensko, domácí), Rostislav STANĚK (203 Česká republika, domácí) a Milan BRÁZDIL (203 Česká republika, domácí)

Vydání

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, AMSTERDAM, ELSEVIER, 2022, 0167-4870

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50101 Psychology

Stát vydavatele

Nizozemské království

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 3.500

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14740/22:00127082

Organizační jednotka

Středoevropský technologický institut

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520

UT WoS

000786690100003

Klíčová slova anglicky

Bargaining; Reciprocity; Group norms; Cooperation

Štítky

podil, rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 14. 2. 2023 08:59, Mgr. Tereza Miškechová

Anotace

V originále

Norms for cooperation are essential for groups to function effectively, yet there are often strong incentives for group members to behave selfishly. Direct and indirect reciprocity can help to discourage such uncooperative behaviour by punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators, but require explicit means for punishment and tally-keeping. What, then, encourages an individual to cooperate with their group when others cannot track the behaviour of others? We adapted the Bargaining Game to examine the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among 20 groups of six anonymous players (N = 120) who interacted amongst themselves over recursive bargaining exchanges. By estimating the expected utility that drives players’ demands in these interactions, we demonstrate that their behaviour on each exchange reflects the demands placed upon them previously. Thus, we highlight the role of generalised reciprocity in such situations; that is, when an individual passes on to another member of their group the behaviour they have received previously. Furthermore, we identify four distinct behavioural types that differ in their expressions of generalised reciprocity: Some players converge quickly on cooperative demands regardless of the behaviour they received from their co-players, and are therefore characterised by low expressions of reciprocity. In contrast, individuals with strong reciprocal tendencies decrease their demands over successive interactions in response to the behaviour of their group. By simulating groups with different compositions of these player types, we reveal the strong influence of individual differences in reciprocal tendencies on the emergence of cooperative group dynamics.

Návaznosti

GA18-21791S, projekt VaV

Název: Tam a zpět: Zkoumání rovnováhy mezi vlastními cíli a cíli druhých během vyjednávání s použitím metody hyperscanning (Akronym: BAF)

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Back and Forth: Striking the balance between self and other goals in negotiation.

Přiložené soubory

1-s2.0-S0167487022000356-main.pdf

Citovat

SALAZAR ADAMS, Miguel, Daniel Joel SHAW, Kristína CZEKÓOVÁ, Rostislav STANĚK a Milan BRÁZDIL. The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER, 2022, roč. 90, June, s. 1-13. ISSN 0167-4870. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520.

@article{2229079,
   author = {Salazar Adams, Miguel and Shaw, Daniel Joel and Czekóová, Kristína and Staněk, Rostislav and Brázdil, Milan},
   article_location = {AMSTERDAM},
   article_number = {June},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520},
   keywords = {Bargaining; Reciprocity; Group norms; Cooperation},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0167-4870},
   journal = {JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY},
   title = {The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms},
   url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520},
   volume = {90},
   year = {2022}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2229079
AU  - Salazar Adams, Miguel - Shaw, Daniel Joel - Czekóová, Kristína - Staněk, Rostislav - Brázdil, Milan
PY  - 2022
TI  - The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms
JF  - JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
VL  - 90
IS  - June
SP  - 1-13
EP  - 1-13
PB  - ELSEVIER
SN  - 01674870
KW  - Bargaining
KW  - Reciprocity
KW  - Group norms
KW  - Cooperation
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520
N2  - Norms for cooperation are essential for groups to function effectively, yet there are often strong incentives for group members to behave selfishly. Direct and indirect reciprocity can help to discourage such uncooperative behaviour by punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators, but require explicit means for punishment and tally-keeping. What, then, encourages an individual to cooperate with their group when others cannot track the behaviour of others? We adapted the Bargaining Game to examine the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among 20 groups of six anonymous players (N = 120) who interacted amongst themselves over recursive bargaining exchanges. By estimating the expected utility that drives players’ demands in these interactions, we demonstrate that their behaviour on each exchange reflects the demands placed upon them previously. Thus, we highlight the role of generalised reciprocity in such situations; that is, when an individual passes on to another member of their group the behaviour they have received previously. Furthermore, we identify four distinct behavioural types that differ in their expressions of generalised reciprocity: Some players converge quickly on cooperative demands regardless of the behaviour they received from their co-players, and are therefore characterised by low expressions of reciprocity. In contrast, individuals with strong reciprocal tendencies decrease their demands over successive interactions in response to the behaviour of their group. By simulating groups with different compositions of these player types, we reveal the strong influence of individual differences in reciprocal tendencies on the emergence of cooperative group dynamics.
ER  -

SALAZAR ADAMS, Miguel, Daniel Joel SHAW, Kristína CZEKÓOVÁ, Rostislav STANĚK a Milan BRÁZDIL. The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms. \textit{JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY}. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER, 2022, roč.~90, June, s.~1-13. ISSN~0167-4870. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520.

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